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The Legality of Picketing 
Suzanne Handman 
and 
John Leopold 
The authors attempt, by means of «jurisprudence » to dé-
termine the conditions and circumstances which render 
picketing légal or illégal. Within this context, picketing 
will be examined from the point of view of object, form 
and occasion. In addition, the sanction of picketing will 
be presented, followed by a critique of the subject. 
Picketing constitutes one of the forms of pressure generally asso-
ciated with labour disputes and particularly strikes. The term «picke-
ting» is ancient. Originally, it was used in connection with military ac-
tivités, describing a party of sentinels or an outlying post.1 The 
earliest use of the term in légal literature has been traced to the case of 
Regina v. Druitt2 in 1867, but the actions which it encompasses hâve 
been known to the law for a much longer period.3 Since the term is not 
a légal one, its meaning must be derived from popular usage. The fol-
lowing passage from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, cited by 
Finkelman, provides an explanation of what picketing connotes:4 
«The principal method employed to prevent strike breaking is that 
of picketing by strikers or their représentatives at or near the en-
trance to the place of employment. » 
Thus picketing consists of the présence of one or more persons with or 
without placards, generally at the premises of the employer during a 
labour conflict. This de vice is employed for any one or more of the fol-
lowing purposes : to inform those unaware of the fact that a strike is in 
progress ; to persuade workers to join the strike ; to discourage or pre-
vent the public from doing business with the «struck» establishment, 
or to urge non-unionized workers to join the union. 
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Although picketing is a relatively common and familiar occurence, 
its légal status poses a problem. There is no référence whatsoever to 
picketing in the Québec Labour Code or in any other Québec law. The 
Canadian Labour Code provides no solution since this code also does 
not mention the term. 
At présent, the only Canadian province which has any législation 
dealing with the subject is British Columbia. The work «picket» ap-
pears in the Labour Code of British Columbia, 1974 c. 87, and is 
defined in S. 1 in the following manner: 
«Picket or «picketing» means watching and besetting, or attending 
at or near an employer's place of business, opérations or employ-
ment for the purpose of persuading or attempting to persuade 
anyone not to: 
i) enter that employer's place of business, opérations or em-
ployment; or 
ii) deal in or handle the products of that employer ; and 
iii) do business with that employer, and any similar act at such 
place that has an équivalent purpose.» 
This définition confines and limits picketing in terms of place, that 
is, at or near any employer's place of business; and in terms of pur-
pose, that is, of persuading or attempting to persuade anyone not to 
enter that employer's place of business, opérations, or employment. 
With the exception of British Columbia, due to the absence of any 
other législation on picketing, ail other provinces must fall back on the 
Criminal Code, since it is the only law which deals with the activity 
without, however, specifically using the term. 
Article 381 of the Criminal Code states in part: 
1. «Everyone who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for 
the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing 
anything that he has a lawful right to do, or to do anything that he 
has a lawful right to abstain from doing... 
f) besets or watches the dwelling house or place where that per-
son résides, works, carries on business or happens to be, or... 
is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
2. A person who attends at or near or approaches a dwelling 
house or place for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating 
information does not watch or beset within the meaning of this sec-
tion. » 
Although the words «watches» and «besets» are not defined by 
this article, it has been recognized and accepted that they refer to the 
activity known as picketing. Thus, because of the exception established 
by paragraph 2 of article 381, picketing an establishment for the pur-
pose of obtaining or communicating information does not constitute an 
offence. 
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The Criminal Code implicity defines and permits picketing. It does 
not, however, indicate to what extent this conduct is permissible. Nei-
ther the limits nor the effects are codified. 
Picketing may serve various purposes. It may vary as to its form 
and take place during différent occasions. For example, picketing may 
consist solely of a few persons quietly walking back and forth carrying 
placards stating their grievances. However, can picketers verbally as-
sault others in their attemts to persuade them of their cause and can 
they go as far as resorting to physical violence ? Just how much of the 
foregoing can a picket carry out ? 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse this problem. More 
specifically, the authors will attempt, by means of «jurisprudence» in 
Québec, to détermine the conditions and circumstances which render 
picketing légal or illégal. Within this context, picketing will be exami-
ned from the point of view of object, form and occasion. In addition, 
the sanction of picketing will be presented, followed by a critique of 
the subject. 
LEGAL PICKETING 
Historical Perspective : 
In the absence of spécifie législation on picketing, freedom of 
speech could well constitute a légal basis for picketing. For example, 
the First Amendment to the American Constitution states that 
Congress cannot make any law which would abridge the freedom of 
speech or the right of people to peaceably assemble. While this princi-
ple has been recognized by the courts as a basis for picketing in the 
United States, the same cannot be said of Canada. In effect, there 
exists no équivalent statute to the First Amendment in our fédéral or 
provincial laws. In contrast, the right to picket in Canada developed 
initiaily through the courts' interprétation of British cases and later 
through an interprétation of what is now section 381(2) of the Criminal 
Code. 
In England, during the 19th century, the law and the courts were 
consistently anti-labour. In fact, up until 1871, ail organized labour ac-
tivity constituted a « criminal conspiracy ». 
In 1871, législation in England began to be directed towards im-
proving the existing imbalance between labour and management. The 
Trade Union Act4 of 1871 established that the doctrine of conspiracy in 
the restraint of trade no longer applied to trade unions. Labour oppo-
sed this bill maintaining that the gênerai provisions applicable 
specifically to trade unions should apply to the community at large. 
This protest resulted in separating the criminal provisions from those 
legalizing trade unions. Thèse provisions were embodied in the Crimi-
nal Law Amendment Act.5 Labour, however, was still dissatisfied since 
4
 341 35 Vict., c. 31. 
5
 34 and 35 Vict., c. 32. 
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the said Act included a section which rendered «watching and beset-
ting» an offence. The government finally introduced législation, The 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act6 of 1875 which was accep-
table to trade unions. Section 7 of tins Act appeared to assure trade 
unions the right of peaceful picketing. 
Législation in Canada was adopted along the same lines as that in 
England. In 1972, the fédéral government enacted the Trade Unions 
Act1 which was similar to the Criminal Law Amendment Acts of 1871. 
Following labour's protest, a new act was adopted in 1876.9. This Act 
was based substantially on the Conspiracy and Protection of Property 
Act10 of 1875 in which «watching and besetting» in order to communi-
cate information was no longer a criminal offence. However, when 
criminal law was Consolidated in 1892 in the Criminal Code11, the 
«peaceful picketing» clause was not included. Watching and besetting 
became an offence, and thus trade unionists who picketed during the 
course of a strike faced possible criminal prosecution for this activity. 
Labour strenuously protested the omission of the «peaceful 
Picketing » section and demanded that the privilège of peaceful picke-
ting be restored to them. The government finally ceded to their de-
mands and amended the Criminal Code12 in 1934 so that according to 
Section 501, a person who attends a place for the purpose solely to ob-
tain or give information does not commit the offence of intimidation by 
«watching and besetting». Article 381(2) which reproduces the 1934 
amendment thus offers strikers protection from criminal prosecution for 
picketing in order to obtain or communicate information. 
While the 1934 amendment established that picketing for the pur-
pose of obtaining or communicating information was légal, the question 
lay in determining whether peaceful picketing, having the aim of per-
suading others not to work during a labour dispute was a tortious act 
enabling an employer to sue for damages and to take an action for in-junction. 
The two relevant cases cited in Canada as authorities on the issue 
were Lyons v. Wilkins 13 and Ward, Loch v. O.P.A.S.14 In Lyons v. 
Wilkins15, members of a trade union went on strike and established a 
picket Une at the plaintiff s premises in order to persuade other em-
ployées to cease working. The défendants claimed that since they pea-
cefully attempted to persuade workmen not to work, the activity did 
6
 38 and 39 Vict., c. 86. 
7
 S.C., 1872, c. 31. 
8
 Supra, note 6. 
9
 S.C., 1876, c. 37. 
10
 Supra. 
11
 S.C., 1892, c. 29, s. 523. 
12
 S.C., 1934, C. 47, s. 12. 
13
 (1899) 1 ch. 255. 
14
 (1906)22T.L.R. 327. 
15
 Supra, note 13. 
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not fall within the provisions of section 7 (subsection 4) of the 1875 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act.I6 The court, however, held 
that picketing constituted a common law nuisance. In reaching the dé-
cision that watching and besetting was a common law nuisance, section 
7 of the said Act was interpreted to mean that:17 
«the only case in which watching or beseting is allowed, or, in 
other words, is not unlawful, is that mentioned in the proviso at the 
end of the section — namely, where the attending at or near the 
house... or works... is in order merely to obtain or communicate 
information. Attending in order to persuade is not within the pro-
viso. » 
Both Lindley, M. R., and Chitty, L. J., maintained that to watch or 
beset a man's house with the view to compel him to carry out or not 
carry out an activity was a wrongful act unless there was reasonable 
justification since such conduct interfères with the comfort and enjoy-
ment of the «house beset». 
In the case of Ward, Lock,ls an opposing point of view was ta-
ken. The défendant union placed its members around the plaintiff s bu-
siness to persuade Ward, Lock's employées to join the union and cease 
working for their employer. Their object was to compel the plaintiff to 
employ union men only. An action was taken for damages and for an 
injunction to restrain the picketers from inducing breaches of contract, 
committing nuisance and watching and besetting. The court interpreted 
the words « wrongful and without légal authority » of section 7 of the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act19 in a différent manner 
from the previous case. Hère, the court decided that the phrase 
«wrongful and without légal authority» did not apply to the word 
compel. They only added a criminal remedy to acts for which there 
was already a civil remedy. Judge Moulton stated:20 
«I cannot see that this section affects or is intended to affect civil 
rights or civil remédies. It legalizes nothing, and it renders nothing 
wrongful that was not so before. » 
The judge added:21 
«The restriction that the acts referred to must in themselves be at 
least civil torts is plainly expressed by the présence of the words 
«wrongfully» which applies equally to ail classes... What, then is 
the effect of the exception which is made by the last paragraph of 
the section? In my opinion, that part of the section does exactly 
what its language expresses and no more. It expressly excepts a 
subclass of acts from the opération of the section... »20 
16
 Supra, note 7. 
17
 Supra, note 13, p. 271. 
18
 Supra, note 14. 
19
 Supra, note 7. 
20
 Supra, note 14, p. 329. 
21
 Ibid, p. 329. 
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Given this interprétation, the picketing was not found to be an offence 
within s. 7 of the Act and, therefore, did not constitute a common law 
nuisance. 
In England, the two conflicting décisions were resolved by the 
Trade Disputes Act22 of 1906. Specifically, section 2 of the Act assured 
workers of the right to picket peacefully. The purpose of picketing was 
not only for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information but 
also for the purpose of peacefully persuading others to work or abstain 
from working. There is, however, no équivalent to this section in Ca-
nadian législation. The question, therefore, was whether Lyons v. 
Wilkins23 of Ward, Lock24 applied. Both the doctrine and the majority 
of cases25 decided in favour of Ward, Lock26. 
The controversy was finally resolved by the Suprême Court in 
Williams v. Aristrocratic Restaurants.21 Following a breakdown in 
contract negotiations, a trade union, certified as the bargaining agent of 
the employées in one of the employer's restaurants, set up a picket line 
in front of ail the employer's restaurants. The picketers paraded with 
placards which truthfully stated that the employer had no agreements 
with the union. On appeal from a décision directing that the picketing 
be enjoined, the court held that the picketing did not constitute a nui-
sance. Référence was made to the English cases previously cited. With 
regard to Lyons v. Wilkins2*, Judge Rand indicated that he could not 
folio w the décision rendered if section 7 of the 1875 Act excluded 
compulsion as the object of picketing or if this section was taken to 
mean that compulsion cannot be brought about by persuasion. Hence 
he stated :2 9 
«for what conceivable use or purpose would information be fur-
nished if not to win support by the persuasive force of the matter 
exhibited? » 
He concurred with the décision of Ward, Lock30 since in his opinion 
the conduct was justified by society's interest in the labour dispute and 
to compel by means or persuasion is a normal incident of industrial 
compétition. 
In addition the conduct was considered to fall within the provi-
sions of s. 501 of the Criminal Code (now section 381 (2)) and section 3 
22
 6 ED. vii, c. 47. 
23
 Supra, note 13. 
24
 Supra, note 14. 
25
 Vulcan Iron Works v. Winnipeg Lodge (1911) 21 Man. L.R. 473. 
Reners v. The King (1926) C.R. 499 per Idington, J. 
R. v. Baldassari (1931) 55 C.C.C. (Ont. S.C.). 
26
 Supra, note 14. 
27
 (1951)S.C.R. 762. 
28
 Supra, note 13. 
2 9
 //>/</., p . 783. 
30
 Supra, note 14. 
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of the Trade-unions A et31. Section 3 of this Act not only absolves every-
one from liability for communicating to any workman, artisan, labour-
er, employée or person, facts respecting employment but also removes 
liability for «persuading or endeavouring to persuade by fair or reaso-
nable argument».32 Thus the court held that the manner of picketing 
was lawful according to both criminal law and civil law. 
Although this case did not define with any appréciable précision 
the limits of peaceful picketing, it did détermine that section 501 permit-
ted this activity. Furthermore, the judgment established that picketing 
could go beyond obtaining or giving information, as set out in the sec-
tion: picketing could be carried out in the form of peaceful persuasion. 
In this sensé, Aristocratie Restaurants33 is a landmark décision. 
Présent Status: 
Notwithstanding the absence of a formai définition of picketing in 
our laws, the doctrine and the courts34 hâve followed the précèdent set 
by Aristocratie Restaurants35, and hâve continued to define peaceful 
picketing on the basis of section 381(2) of the Criminal Code. In sum, 
this section has been interpreted and has become accepted as providing 
the légal basis for peaceful picketing. 
It is now an accepted principle, that workers hâve the right to 
picket for the purpose of obtaining and giving information and more 
specifically to advise and urge other workers to join a union or not to 
work. However, in achieving their aims, it is évident that picketers 
must respect the conditions established by the courts in order for the 
Act to remain lawful. Thèse conditions deal with the form, object and 
occasion of a picket line. 
ILLEGAL PICKETING 
Causes 
Form 
Lord Lindley, in Quinn v. Leathem36 declared that a «combina-
tion not to work is one thing and is lawful. A combination to prevent 
others from working by annoying them if they do is a very différent 
31
 R.S.B.C. 1948, c. 342. 
32
 Supra, note 27, p. 797. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Nedco Ltd. v. Canadian Union of Communication Workers, Unreported Judg-
ment, C.S. Montréal 05-0082-34-73, rendered 27 June, 1973; Borek v. Amalgamated 
Méat Cutters, (1956) C.S. 533 ; Ritz Carlton Hôtel Co. Ltd. v. Union des Employés d'Hô-
tel, (1970) R.D. T. 28; Shane v. Lupovich, (1942) B.R. 523; General Dry Batteries v. 
Brigenshaw, (1951) 4 D.L.R. 41 Peerless Laundry v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers 
(1952) 4 D.L.R. 475 ; Arden Fur Corp. v. Montréal Fur Workers Union, (1966) C.S. 417. 
35
 Supra, note 27. 
36
 (1901) A.C. 495. 
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thing and is prima facie unlawful».37 Similarly, in the case of Canadian 
Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. C.S.N.38 the court declared that a union and its 
members cannot take the law into their own hands to force an indivi-
dual to stop working. According to this interprétation, the right to 
picket must, like any other right, be exercised so as not to interfère 
with the rights of others. 
Thèse judgments thus maintain that picketing which prevents 
other workers from entering their place of work is illégal. This illegality 
may take a number of différent forms. 
Violence and Intimidation. 
Roy Heenan in his articles, «Strikes, Picketing and Injunctions in 
Québec,» declared that:39 
«it goes without saying that acts of violence and intimidation are 
illégal.» 
This principle has repeatedly been affirmed by the Québec judi-
ciary.40 In Commission Hydro-Électrique de Québec v. L'Union Inter-
nationale des Journaliers Local 617 et autres,41 the Court held that:42 
« même une grève légale ne peut justifier un piquet illégal où l'on 
emploie l'intimidation, la violence, les menaces, la coercition... » 
It is clear that the right to picket does not confer on picketers the 
right, through intimidation or violence, to prevent others from working. 
This principle is not only applied objectively but it also may be applied 
subjectively. The courts look beyond the actions of the picketers in a 
given situation. In other words, they look beyond the mère existence of 
intimidation or violence. In The Foundation Company of Canada Ltd. 
and International Fibre Board Ltd. v. The Building and Construction 
Trades Council of Hull & District and other,43, it was established that 
the mère existence of a picket line, formerly intimidating and violent, 
would still serve as a constant reminder of past punishments and mise-
ries, and of possible présent and mostly probable future retaliation.44 
Picketing was therefore declared illégal, albeit devoid of violence and 
intimidation. Thus, if any picket line, at a certain point in its existence, 
becomes violent and intimidating, it can be argued, in light of the 
37
 Ibid., note 45, p. 538. 
38
 (1973) C.A. 1075. 
39
 Roy HEENAN, «Strikes, Picketing and Injunctions in Québec», (1967) 13 
McGill L.J. 367 at p. 379. 
40
 Borek v. Amalgamated Méat Cutters, (1956) C.S. 533; Acton Vale Silk Mills 
Ltd. v. Léveilléejet autres, (1940) 78 C.S. 19; Bulk-Lift Systems v. Warehousemen & 
Miscellaneous, (1975) 75 C.L.L.C. 726. 
41
 (1968) C.S. 10. 
42
 Ibid., p. 13. 
43
 (1961) C.S. 21. 
44
 Ibid., p. 22. 
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above judgment, that the picket will forever be illégal since it serves as 
a constant reminder of this past activity. Such a criterion is not only 
subjective, conferring wide discretionary power to the judiciary, but 
also is highly arbitrary, serving to nullify the légal right to picket since 
it assumes a priori that there will be violence. 
Obstruction 
Independent of the question of violence and intimidation, if access 
to the picketed premises is blocked by the picketers, such an act is 
wrongful and without lawful authority. The problem lies in determining 
at what point the access is considered to be blocked. There seems to 
be little doubt as to the illegality of picketing when workers attempt to 
enter and are prevented from doing so (without the occurrence of vio-
lence of intimidation).45 
Thus, any situation where a person wants to enter the picketed 
premises, and where such person is prevented from doing so, the 
picketing must be declared illégal. Consistent with this principle, the 
courts hâve condemned the practice of certain unions of establishing a 
«Pass System». Under this system, the union décides whom it will al-
low to cross the picket line, and issues passes to them. By implication, 
and in fact, any other operson is not allowed to enter.46 This system 
was declared illégal in the cases of Dominion Textile Company Limited 
v. Le Syndicat Catholique des Ouvriers du Textile de Magog Inc. 
(C.N.T.U.)41 and Union Nationale des Employés de Vickers v. Cana-
dian Vickers Limited.48 
If no concrète obstruction exists, the question of the legality of 
the picket line is far more complex. Can the picketing be illégal if there 
exists no interférence with any person attempting to pass through the 
picket line? In other words, if a person who of his own volition refuses 
to cross the picket line, is there an illegality? The courts seem reluc-
tant to qualify picketing as illégal in such circumstances. In Nedco v. 
Clark and ail other members of Communication Workers of Canada, 
Local no. 4,50 it was found that there were no grounds for restraining 
the lawful picketing of the respondent since the picketing did not inter-
fère with any person passing on the sidewalk, with any customer or 
with any deliveries. Mr. Justice Culliton indicated that if any person 
refused to enter the picketed premises, they did so of their own will 
because they did not choose to cross a picket line. Hence their refusai 
to enter was not because of any obstruction preventing their entry to 
the building. 
45
 Tricot Somerset Inc. v. Le syndicat catholique du tricot Somerset Inc., (1954) 
R.L. 93. 
46
 Supra, note 39, p. 380. 
47
 Unreported judgment C.S. St-François 31,520. 
48
 (1958) B.R. 470. 
50
 (1973) 73 C.L.L.C. 184. 
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From this and other judgments,51 it is évident that when there has 
been no obstruction, but employées will not cross a picket line due to 
their personal convictions, the picketing is not considered by the courts 
to be unlawful. It is only when picketing is of a nature to prevent the 
owner, his représentatives or workers from peacefully reaching their 
place of work that it becomes an illégal act. 
Mass Picketing. 
A further considération in determining the legality of picketing is 
the number of people forming the picket line. Does the mère présence 
of a large mass of picketers constitue an illegality ? While in Lupovich 
v. Shane,52 it is stated that the numbers must not exceed «what is rea-
sonably necessary»53, this expression was not defined, thus leading to 
considérable ambiguity on this question. Does five, ten, fifteen, twenty, 
one hundred or one thousand picketers constitute a mass? Not only 
does this case not provide an answer but the number of permissible 
picketers has not been determined precisely in any case of «jurispru-
dence». Admittedly, in the décision where picketing was held to be lé-
gal, the numbers were small; for the most part, there were less than 
eight persons involved in the activity. However, the question as to 
what constitutes a mass still remains unanswered. It is therefore left to 
the discrétion of the courts, according to the facts of each case. 
Ri g ht to Property 
The right to one's property imposes a further limitation upon 
picketing. Even peaceful picketing, when it infringes upon private pro-
perty is considered to be an unlawful act: that of trespass. This inter-
prétation is récent. The courts hâve not always viewed the right to 
property as absolute. The following cases illustrate the controversy that 
has surrounded this question which was resolved by the Suprême 
Court décision oîHarrison v. Carswell.54 
In Grosvenor Park Shopping Centre Ltd. v. Waloshin,55 a shop-
ping centre owner instituted an action in trespass and by means of an 
injunction attempted to restrain his tenant's employées from picketing 
on the sidewalks adjacent to the store premises during a légal strike. 
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's action. 
Their décision was based on the fact that since the owner has extended 
an unrestricted invitation to the public to enter upon the premises, the 
respondent no longer had exclusive possession. 
However, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v. Pet ers56 re-
jected the idea that an owner who invited the public onto his premises 
thereby lost the right to maintain an action in trespass. 
51
 Sasso Disposai Ltd. v. Webster, (1976) 10 O.R. (2d) 304; supra, note 1. 
52
 (1944) 3 D.L.R. 193. 
53
 lbid., p. 203. 
54
 (1975) R.C.S. 200. 
55
 (1965) 46 D.L.R. (2d) 750. 
56
 (1970) 16 D.L.R. (3d) 143. 
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This décision was appealed to the Suprême Court of Canada 
which, when faced with two conflicting Court of Appeal judgments, 
adopted the position of the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The controversy as to whether or not an owner who has extended 
an unrestricted invitation to the public, exercises control over his pro-
perty to the exclusion of other persons was finally resolved in the Car-
swell57 case. In this judgment, the respondent Carswell, who was an 
employée of a tenant in a shopping centre, peacefully picketed the 
premises of her employer while participating in a légal strike. The 
picketing which was exercised directly in front of the struck premises 
was on private property. The respondent was informed by the owner of 
the shopping centre that picketing was not permitted in any area of 
the shopping centre and was advised to move to a public sidewalk, 
some distance away. Carswell's refusai to leave the premises and to 
cease picketing resulted in four charges against her under the Petty 
Trespasses Act.5S In reaching their décision, the Suprême Court rejec-
ted a technique commonly used by American Courts known as the « ba-
lancing of interest»,59 which in this instance would require the Court 
to weigh and détermine the respective values to society of the right to 
property and the right to picket. The Court refused to view the issue in 
terms of this conflict, claiming that such an approach would raise 
difficult political and social issues, the considération of which could be 
resolved only in an arbitrary manner and embody personal, économie 
and social beliefs. Hence, the Court held that the owner of a shopping 
centre had sufficient control or possession of the common areas, 
notwithstanding the unrestricted invitation to the public to enter upon 
the premises, to enable him to invoke the remedy of trespass. Judge 
Dickson who delivered the majority décision stated:60 
« Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has traditionally recognized, as a 
fundamental freedom, the right of the individual to the enjoyment 
of property and the right not to be deprived thereof, or any interest 
therein, save by due process of law. The Législature of Manitoba 
has declared in The Petty Trespass Act that any person who tres-
passes upon land, the property of another, upon or through which 
has been requested by the owner not to enter, is guilty of an of-
fence. » 
In Québec, the Courts hâve based the «right of property» on both 
the Civil Code (art. 399 and 406) and the Criminal Code (art. 501).61 It 
appears from an interprétation of thèse articles and certain provincial 
Acts,62 that peaceful picketing will not be tolerated when it infringes 
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upon private property. Therefore, persons engaged in picketing cannot 
carry out their activity on the personal property of their employer, nor 
in any way damage his property. It follows that in order to constitute a 
légal activity, the picketing must take place on public grounds. 
Objevt. 
Picketing, apart from being illégal on the basis of its form, may 
also be rendered illégal by its object. Object for purposes of this study, 
signifies intent or purpose. As Viscount Simon stated in the case of 
Crofter Hand-Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Vertch :63 
« The rest is not what is the natural resuit to the plaintiffs of such 
combined action, or what is the resulting damage which the défen-
dants realize or should realize will follow, but what is in truth the 
object in the minds of the combiners when they acted as they did. 
It is not conséquence that matters, but purpose.» 
The principle will be analyzed in two separate sections. First, we will 
deal with the gênerai principle of scheming to injure the opérations of a 
company, and in a further section, we will deal with this notion relative 
to the question of placards (see section on placards relative to true sta-
tements). 
Scheming to Injure 
Picketing will be légal if the picketers' intent is to promote the 
interests of the union, but it will be illégal if their intent is to injure 
the interests of the employer. This distinction has been frequently cited 
by the Québec Courts.64 In Seafarers' International Union of Canada 
v. Upper Lakes Shipping Limited,6S members of the Seafarers' Union 
picketed the premises of their former employer, Upper Lakes Shipping. 
The évidence, as cited by the court, established that tug-boat crews 
refused to tow respondent's vessels; that truckers, members of a labour 
union, refused to carry cargo from thèse vessels; and that a party of 
three crew-members from one of thèse vessels were attacked in the 
street by seven men. On the basis of thèse incidents, the court reasoned 
that the picketing was part of a scheme to prevent the carrying on of 
respondent's business. 
It is apparent that the courts hâve further restricted picketing 
by creating a subjective criterion. Not only must picketing be légal 
according to its form (subject to the objective criteria cited previously) 
but it must also be légal according to its object. Thus picketing carried 
out in a peaceful manner, but with the object of injuring the employer's 
business will be illégal. We hâve seen, however, that the détermination 
of what constitutes intent to injure the interests of the employer and 
intent to promote interests of the union is not easily distinguished. 
This naturally has the effect of leaving a great deal of discrétion to 
the courts. 
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Placards. 
a) Intimidating placards 
The courts hâve ruled that picketing is illégal if placards or other 
literature is intimidating. This opinion was clearly expressed in the case 
of Hurtig v. Reiss.bt While the expression «intimidation» has not been 
defined in the context of placards, we must assume that any placard 
which inspires a legitimate fear would fall into this category. In the Ro-
ther67 case, the Court of Appeal stated that if things done, or words 
spoken or written excite fear or a reasonable appréhension of fear or 
danger and so influence those for whom it is intended so as to prevent 
them from freely doing what their désire and the law permits, they may 
be so restrained.68 Thus, it would appear that the mère présence of an 
intimidating placard would render the picketing illégal independent of 
its peaceful manner. 
b) Defamatory Placards 
Black's Law Dictionary defines defamation as : 6 9 
«the offence of injuring a person's character, famé, or réputation 
by false and malicious statements. » 
In gênerai, the question of defamation arises in a civil suit for damages. 
This principle, however, can also be raised as a cause for an illégal 
picket. 
False Statements 
In order for defamation to render picketing illégal, there must be 
proof of a fault. The flrst characteristic «est celle où le défendeur, 
sciemment de mauvaise foi, avec l'intention de nuire, s'attaque à la ré-
putation de la victime et cherche à le ridiculiser ou l'humilier, à l'expo-
ser à la haine ou au mépris du public ou d'un groupe».70 Secondly, 
defamation can also exist without the will of bad faith, provided that 
the information is false and the réputation is damaged. Thus, where 
picketers knowingly or unknowingly damage the réputation of a « moral 
or physical person» through false information contained on placards, 
the picketing becomes illégal. 
We must note, however, that statements on placards thaï: are par-
tially misleading or false, do not necessarily create illégal picketing. In 
Ritz Carlton Hôtel Co. Ltd. v. l'Union des Employés d'Hôtel,71 the 
court expressed the opinion that while the statements on placards in 
66
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that case may not hâve been literally true, they were not patently false 
considering the circumstances and the limitation of space in making 
propaganda by placard. This has raised doubt as to what constitutes a 
«patently false» and «literally true» statement. Nowhere in this case 
or in subséquent case hâve thèse terms been defined. It thus foliows 
that the Courts are again left with wide discrétion in adjudicating upon 
this question. 
True Statement s 
Defamation can occur even if placards paraded are true. Such is 
the case of a placard which has as its only goal to harm the victim. In 
the case of Hurtig v. Reiss,72 the veracity of thèse statements on the 
placards was upheld by the court. Despite this conclusion, however, 
the court held that the parades in which thèse placards were carried, 
and the appeal to the public not to buy the employer's goods indicated 
that their purpose was to injure his business. An injunction was thus 
issued forbidding the carrying or displaying of placards or posters which 
would tend to injure the plaintiff s business. 
Further illustrations of this principle can be found in the cases of 
Allied Amusements v. Reaney73 and/?, v. Baldassari.74 
In contrast, placards with truthful statements paraded with the in-
tent of conveying information to the public are légal. In the case ofBel-
lemare Datsun v. Automobile Protection,75 the respondent, having dis-
covered that the plaintiff sold 1972 cars as 1973 cars, picketed the 
premises of said plaintiff for purposes of informing and warning the pu-
blic of this practice. The court judged the picketing to be légal, conten-
ding that the intent of the respondent was not to harm the plaintiff s 
business by reducing sales, but on the other hand to communicate in-
formation to the public. 
In the case of Wasserman v. Sopman,76 picketing was found to 
be légal where members of a firm of poultry commissioners were, in a 
peaceful fashion, parading signs truthfully stating that such dealer refu-
ses to deal with the picketers' firm. In this judgment, there was no in-
tention on the part of the picketers to injure the plaintiff s, and conse-
quently the picketing was légal. The court further established that even 
if the effect of the placards is to engender loss of trade, an injunction 
cannot be issued. 
We can thus conclude that picketing is légal when : 1) information 
conveyed on the placards is truthful, and 2) the picketers do not hâve 
the intent to injure the plaintiff s business. The prime considération in 
the legality of a picket line is the intent of the picketers and not the 
actual effects that their activities may engender. 
72
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Occasion 
Illégal Sîrikes 
We hâve seen from the foregoing that when any one of a number 
of illégal acts hâve been committed in the «form» or the «object» of 
picketing, the activity consequently becomes illégal. A problem anses 
in instances where the picketing is in itself peaceful (i.e. not illégal in 
terms of its «form» or «object») but is carried out to further an illégal 
strike. The question as to the legality of the picketing under thèse cir-
cumstances has arisen in numerous décisions during the past three dé-
cades. A review of the «jurisprudence» reveals confîicting positions 
taken by the courts over the years. 
During the 1950's, the tendency of the courts was to view peace-
ful picketing as lawful, whether or not the strike was légal.77 
This attitude with regard to peaceful picketing was reversed in the 
early 1960's by a Suprême Court judgment in Gagnon et al. v. Founda-
tion Maritime Limited.78 In this case, officiais of the company refused 
a request made by union organizers for récognition of their union since 
they had not been certified as required under the Labour Relations 
Act.79 Subséquent to the company's décision, a picket Une appeared 
which had the effect of bringing the opérations of the company to a 
standstill. The New Brunswick Suprême Court issued an injunction 
against the picketing, despite its peaceful nature, on the grounds that as 
the strike itself was unlawful, the picketing was unlawful. This décision 
was maintained by the Suprême Court. 
The notion derived from the Gagnon*0 case, that the illegality of 
a strike necessarily renders the concomitant picketing illégal has, with 
few exceptions, been accepted by the courts up to the présent time.81 
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A few décisions in the latter period of the i960's had been inter-
preted as a renewed reversai of the position of the courts.82 For exam-
ple, in the case of Arden Fur Corp. v. Montréal Fur Workers Union9,3, 
the company requested that the court grant an injunction to stop the 
picketing which took place in front of the business premises. Mr. Jus-
tice Petticombe did not find the conduct of the picketers to be repre-
hensible. He reffered to be décision of Hyde Park Clothes Ltd.,84 
where Mr. Justice Challies indicated that peaceful picketing should not 
be enjoined even when it is in support of an illégal strike. His approval 
of the principle is évident since he applied this reasoning to the présent 
case in which no strike existed and dismissed the application for an in-
junction. 
Further décisions, however, indicate that this favourable attitude 
towards peaceful picketing accompanying an illégal strike did not 
continue. The interruption of the tendency established in the early 
i960's was only temporary. Evidence of this may be found from Judge 
Deslaurier's statement at p. 40 in Imprimerie Montréal, Offset Inc. v. 
l'Union Typographique Jacques-Cartier :85 
«Si l'arrêt de travail constitue une grève et si cette grève est exécu-
tée en violation des dispositions formelles de la loi, le tribunal est 
d'opinion que tout guet, même paisible, devient illégal à moins qu'il 
ne soit autorisé par une disposition législative édictée à cette fin. » 
In the décision of Thomson Electrical Works v. McGraw et al, the 
défendants, who were engaged in picketing, were not members of a 
trade union. The Court stated that since the défendants were not car-
rying out a lawful union activity, they had no right to picket. The court 
came to a similar conclusion in Rudolf Martin Enterprises Ltd. and 
Laukkanen Construction Ltd. v. International Union of Elevât or Cons-
tructors,97 and Masco Construction Ltd. v. International Union of 
Operating Engineers.88 
It is évident that the Courts hâve considered picketing, even when 
peaceful, to be illégal where it is carried out in support of an illégal 
strike or where this activity has taken place in violation of any relevant 
législation. Given that the latter judgments cited are récent, it may be 
concluded that this is the présent position of the judiciary. 
82
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Sanction: The Injunction. 
General notions 
The injunction is the common sanction against illégal picketing. 
While the illegality of picketing can also resuit in criminal proceedings 
and civil suits, we will focus our attention on the question of injunc-
tions. 
Injunctions are divided into two separate catégories. First, injunc-
tions are either restrictive or mandatory. This refers to the nature of 
the order issued pursuant to the pétition. The second classification 
comprises injunctions which are either interlocutory or final. This cate-
gory refers to the mode and timing of the pétition. 
The most common form of injunction, the restrictive injunction, 
orders a party (the défendant) not to do or to cease doing a certain act. 
It is this injunction which commonly sanctions illégal picketing. On the 
other hand, the mandatory injunction orders the respondent to do or 
perforai a certain act. Article 751 CCP states that the mandatory in-
junction is only available « in cases which admit of it », namely those 
instances where spécifie performance is the appropriate solution. 
Injunctions are also classified according to the mode and timing of 
the pétition. The interlocutory injunction may be obtained either at the 
beginning of the principal action or at any time during the suit (article 
752). Its primary purpose is to préserve the status quo until judgment on 
the principal action has been rendered. Article 753 states that the in-
terlocutory injunction must be applied for by a motion to the court 
supported by an affidavit affirming the truth of the facts alleged. Fur-
thermore, it must be served upon the opposite party with mention of 
the date when it will be presented. 
The intérim interlocutory injunction is an exceptional form of the 
interlocutory injunction. While obtained in the same manner as the or-
dinary interlocutory, it is not served on the opposite party, thereby de-
nying the said party the opportunity of refuting the allégations contai-
ned therein. Moreover, article 753 restricts the use of the intérim in-
junction to cases of extrême urgency. Consistent with this principle, 
the court in Tricot Somerset Inc. V. Le Syndicat Catholique*9 conside-
red «qu'il était donc urgent et impérieux de décerner une injonction in-
térimaire de façon à mettre fin au piquetage». Finally, we must note 
that the intérim injunctions cannot be granted for a period exceeding 
ten days and, in fact, is rarely granted for more than five days. 
The interlocutory injunction, whether ordinary or intérim, is go-
verned by the criteria set down in article 752, par. 2., C.C.P. This arti-
cle states that injunctions may be granted on an interlocutory basis 
only if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case in his favour, and is 
suffering serious or irréparable damage. In applying thèse criteria, the 
courts use what is known as the «balance of inconvenience» theory. 
Supra, note 45, p. 102. 
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Thus, an injunction will be granted only when the alleged injury to the 
petitioner is greater than the préjudice to the respondent should the in-
junction be accorded. The court must in effect balance or weigh the 
inconvenience that each party might suffer depending on whether the 
injunction is granted or not. 
The final injunction, on the other hand, is sought as the conclu-
sion of the principal action. The procédural requirements governing 
such an injunction are similar to those governing ail principal actions 
where the fault alleged is outlined in the writ and served on the oppo-
site party. The court, in such cases, is not concerned with prima facie 
rights. Instead it will restrict itself to the considération of real rights in 
deciding whether to grant or refuse an injunction. We must note that in 
determining the merits of an application for a final injunction, the court 
will not use the criteria outlined in article 752, C.C.P. relative to the 
granting of an interlocutory injunction. 
In labour disputes, the injunction is most frequently used to res-
train unlawful picketing by strikers or others at the employer's or so-
meone else's place of business. Previously, we hâve seen that picketing 
may be illégal because of its form, object or occasion. In any of thèse 
instances where picketing is illégal, the petitioner may apply for an in-
terlocutory or intérim injunction even before the merits of the case 
hâve been judged. Where an act is held to be illégal, an injunction ge-
nerally will be granted. We must note, however, that the question of 
whether to hâve an injunction and what is in fact enjoined by an in-
junction is the décision of the presiding judge. Finally, we must add 
that if picketing is declared légal, no injunctions will be granted, be it 
interlocutory, intérim or final. 
Criticisms 
Numerous criticisms hâve been levied against the injunction, par-
ticularly of the interlocutory type. For example, Carrothers contends 
that it is granted in language broader than the circumstances warrant, 
and in légal phraseology often incompréhensible to the laymen.90 Other 
complaints are cited by Mr. Justice Laskin in «The Labour Injunction 
in Canada.»91 Thèse include the far-reaching terms of the order crea-
ting fear in those who are enjoinded, the circumscription of union acti-
vity beyond the needs of the particular case and the prejudgment of the 
issues involved in a labour dispute. It also has been found that injunc-
tions produce resentment and antagonism that frequently resuit in acts 
of violence which did not exist prior to the injunction order. 
The most common criticism of the injunction is that it is generally 
granted ex parte. In this case, the party petitioning the court for an in-
junction files affidavits containing allégations of fact which naturally is 
prejudiced in his favour. The déponents are not cross-examined nor is 
90
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their évidence, often on information and belief, tested in any other 
way. Based upon this évidence, the judge décides whether or not the 
petitioner has a prima facie case required for the issuance of an injunc-
tion. The merits of the case are not considered at this point. The oppo-
sing party not only is absent but is not notified of the hearing and thus 
has no possibility of refuting the allégations. It follows that the party 
enjoined is not even aware of the existence of the court order until it is 
served upon him. 
In our estimate, this procédure violâtes the rules of natural jus-
tice, specifically that of the rule «audi alteram partem» since the effect 
of the ex parte injunction is to deprive one of the parties of his rights 
without having had the opportunity to be heard by the court. It is im-
possible for the court to claim that its judgments are made objectively 
when only one of the parties to the dispute has been presented. 
Furthermore, since it is normal for the employer to présent argu-
ments in his own favour and interpret the facts to his advantage, and 
since the union is not présent at the hearing, it is not surprising that ex 
parte injunctions are granted so readily. Thus, the fact of not taking the 
other party into account not only violâtes a fundamental right, the right 
to be heard, but results in a préjudice in favour of the petitioner. 
It may be argued that since the issues are determined at trial, 
there is no need for labour to be heard at the time of the ex parte hea-
ring.92 In actual fact, the majority of cases never reach trial on the me-
rits. Viewed in this light, any claim that considération is given to 
unions' interests appears to be unfounded. 
Others défend the injunction on the grounds that it may be appea-
led. Given this recourse, it is argued that in cases where the injunction 
was granted without justification it will be dismissed and damages 
awarded. In reality, however, the removal of an injunction at a later 
date is of little value. The décision in Canuk Lines Limited v. Seafa-
rer's International Union of Canada and others 93 clearly illustrâtes this 
point. In this case, Canuk, owner of the S.S. Canuk, fired ail his crew 
members in Hong Kong in order to fiée himself of a collective agree-
ment he had signed with the Seafarer's International Union (S.LU.). 
According to the agreement the ship was to be manned by a crew 
composed of Canadians who were members of the S.LU. He then hi-
red a new crew composed entirely of Hong Kong nationals at rates 
considerably lower than those in effect in Canada. In 1962, when the 
S.S. Canuk Trader arrived in Montréal, the S.I.U. established a picket 
Une to publicize the fact that its members had been fired. Because of 
the refusai of the stevedores of the International Longshoremen's As-
sociation to cross the picket Une, Canuk petitioned for and obtained 
first an intérim injunction and then an interlocutory injunction in Au-
gust, 1962. On Octobre 31, 1963, more than a year from the time the 
intérim injunction was issued, the court decided that the damages suf-
92
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fered by Canuk were not caused by the Union simply because the 
Longshoremen respected the picket line. The court held that the S.LU. 
had the right to establish a picket line to protect the interests of its 
members since the employer had broken the collective agreement. 
While it was decided that a picket line could be established legally, this 
proved to be little consolation for the union. In effect, by the time the 
judgment was rendered, the ship had long departed. In light of this 
fact, it is évident that the re-establishment of a picket line would hâve 
had no purpose. In addition, it must be noted that the S.LU. dit not 
obtain any damages for the préjudice incurred by the issuance of the 
injunction. 
The injunction is not the only recourse available to the employer 
for a breach of contract, infringement upon property or a criminal 
charge. However, during the course of a labour-management struggle a 
criminal suit or other civil actions are in no way as effective as the in-
junction. Thèse procédures can drag on for months if not years. In ad-
dition, they do not prevent the récurrence of picketing or other union 
acts. The injunction, on other hand, provides management with immé-
diate results and forces compliance with the court order. Thus the in-
junction is used frequently by management rather than alternate légal 
procédures. If we recognize that a certain equilibrium must exist 
between labour and management during a labour dispute, then the posi-
tion of the workers is seriously affected when the right of picketing has 
been removed. When a court order is issued to hait picketing, it not 
only compromises the union's position for the duration of the labour 
dispute but it has the effect of eliminating one of the essential weapons 
that workers possess in the dispute. The tactic of having picketing en-
joined demoralizes the workers and breaks their solidarity. In fact, 
once an injunction is granted enjoining picketing, it can effectively hâve 
the conséquence of breaking a strike. Thus, this tactic successfully 
produces a destabilizing effect in the relations between the two parties. 
In light of the above, if the balance of inconvenience test is to be 
applied strictly, the injurious effect of the injunction on labour's activi-
tés must be considered to the same extent as the irréparable injury to 
management. Given the frequency with which injunctions are granted 
to the employer this does not seem to be the case at présent. It appears 
évident that some changes are warranted in order to arrive at a solution 
which would be acceptable and just to both parties. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been recognized by law that workers hâve the right to 
group themselves into associations; to form and negotiate collective 
agreements and to engage in strikes. Because of the growing impor-
tance of the labour movement in the past century, it became essential 
to legislate on thèse and other areas of labour relations. Hence, the 
Labour Code indicates the requirements which must be met in order 
for the various rights of labour to be recognized. Therefore, it is illogi-
cal that picketing, a common élément in labour disputes, has not been 
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codified in our laws. The absence of such législative provision has left 
the judiciary with an unwarranted degree of discrétion. The Courts thus 
détermine the legality of a picket on purely subjective criteria. This 
was underlined in the cited cases of mass picketing, obstruction and 
even of violence. In the latter situation, in the case of Foundation, the 
mère existence of a picket line served as a constant reminder of past 
threats. Thus, while the picketing was peaceful in this case, the Court's 
interprétation rendered the picketing illégal because of some imagined 
appréhension. Furthermore, we may add that apart from the détermina-
tion of the legality of the picket, the Courts hâve almost complète dis-
crétion in deciding upon the ultimate sanction of such illegality — the 
injunction. 
Although a certain élément of discrétion is exercised in any judi-
cial décision, thèse décisions are based on the interprétation of an exis-
ting law. Such is not the case in the realm of picketing. Given the ab-
sence of any législative authority, the Courts set their own guidelines. 
Their discrétion is thus absolute. The authors feel that this situation is 
untenable. 
Moreover, the judiciary has usurped the rôle of the legislator in 
this domain. In effect, when a judge déclares the illegality of picketing 
and issues an injunction, he becomes the private legislator of one party 
against the other. Thus, we find the anomaly of one individual concur-
rent^ exercising two powers, that is the législative and the judiciary. 
Finally, we feel that the judicial branch is unable to deal impar-
tially with the issue of picketing. Because of his background, the judge 
will likely be found to share the same values as the employer, and will 
be more disposed to support the values that uphold thèse rights. The 
folio wing statement by Lord Scrutton in an address delivered before 
the University Law Society, although made more than five décades ago 
has some pertinence even today :9 4 
«I am not speaking of conscious impartiality ; but the habits you 
are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead you to having a 
certain class of ideas of such a nature that when you hâve to deal 
with other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate judgments 
as you would wish. This is one of the great difficulties at présent 
with Labour. Labour says : Where are your impartial judges ? They 
ail move in the same circle as the employers, and they are ail edu-
cated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. How can a 
labour man or trade unionist get impartial justice? It is very 
difficult sometimes to be sure that you hâve put yourself into a tho-
roughly impartial position between two disputants, one of your 
own class and one not of your class. » 
What are the solutions to this complex issue? Proposais hâve ran-
ged from a stricter application of the law to the total abolition of the 
use of injunctions in labour conflicts. 
94
 Supra, note 3 at p. 67. 
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A.W.R. Carrothers in this book The Labour Injunction in British 
Columbia,95 adopts a rather conservative position with regard to the 
problem of labour disputes. While recognizing that certain abuses exist, 
he does not advocate curbing the use of the injunction or modifying the 
law. According to the author, the basic problem concerns the procédu-
res by which it is obtained and the form that the order takes. His pro-
posais therefore deal with both the form and the procédure of the in-
junction. For example, he suggests that affidavits on information and 
belief should be avoided except in cases of imperative need. Concer-
ning ex parte injunctions, he urges that particular care should be taken 
to see that the qualifications of fairness and explicitness are met. Taken 
as a whole, his proposais amount to nothing more than a stricter appli-
cation of the law while leaving the same discretionary powers to the 
judges. He concludes his critique and summary with the following sta-
tement :9 6 
« A number of the above suggestions are not rigid requirements of 
the law. But if they are followed it is submitted that it cannot be 
said with truth and justification that through the abuse of the in-
junctive process there is one law for management and another for 
labour. » 
The implication of this proposai is that if unions and management 
adhère to and obey the law ail injustice will be eliminated. The authors 
do not consider that his proposais alter the présent injustices or offer 
any concrète solutions to the labour-management problem. 
At the other end of the spectrum, labour advocates the total aboli-
tion of the injunction in labour disputes. La Confédération des Syndi-
cats Nationaux, for example, views the injunction as a weapon used by 
management to deprive labour of an effective means of retaliation. The 
following passage illustrâtes their reasoning for opposing the injunc-
tion:97 
«... On peut ajouter qu'une injonction joue contre les groupes qui, 
non seulement tentent de rétablir l'équilibre entre le pouvoir con-
sidérable, qui les tient et le pouvoir subordonné et insuffisant qui 
est leur lot, mais cherchent à réaliser pour eux-mêmes des choses 
d'une importance vitale: meilleurs salaires, sécurité d'emploi plus 
grande, moyens de défense contre les abus quotidiens de l'autorité 
dans l'entreprise, sécurité et hygiène au travail...» 
The total abolition of the injunction (against picketing), in our 
opinion, can only lead to discrimination toward management which 
would be as unjust as the présent use of injunctions is against labour. 
95
 Supra, note 90. 
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 Ibid., p. 215. 
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Therefore, the foliowing solutions are more acceptable to the au-
thors : 
1. Picketing must be codified not only in terms of its définition but in 
ail aspects ; for example, the number of picketers permitted at each en-
trance of the picketed premises, the permissible communication on pla-
cards, a clear-cut définition of intimidation and obstruction, and so on. 
Moreover, we recommend the formation of an administrative mecha-
nism to détermine the norms and application of thèse législative crite-
ria. 
This type of législation would minimize the Court's présent dis-
cretionary powers while in no way negating the rights of labour to use 
what has become a most important weapon in labour disputes. 
2. We recommend the establishment of a labour court composed of 
members of labour, management and the law. This composition would 
avoid the partiality that is said to exist among judges who identify with 
management rather than labour. In addition, the court would deal with 
ail aspects of labour disputes. We make this recommendation bearing 
in mind the existence of arbitration boards because we see the powers 
of the Labour Court being more extensive then those exercised by the 
labour arbitration boards. We suggest that the powers to granl injmic-
tions in labour disputes be removed from the Superior Court and given 
to this Labour Court. The authors' prime objection to the injunction is 
due to the arbitrary manner in which they are issued, the possible par-
tiality of the judges and the usurpation of the législative function rather 
than the injunction per se. It is suggested that injunctions can be per-
mitted if précise législation as to their issuance is enacted, limiting in-
junctions to exceptional circumstances also precisely defined by law. 
This would hâve the effect of removing the présent judicial préjudice 
against picketers while at the same time acknowledging the rights of 
management. Needless to say, ex parte injunctions, in that they violate 
the fundamental right of one of the parties to be heard, must be abo-
lished. 
To sump up, it is évident that the whole area of picketing in its 
various manifestations should be reviewed by the législative and judi-
cial authorities in order to produce a more équitable set of guidelines 
for both labour and management. In the absence of reform, the présent 
acrimony and uncertainty will continue unabated. 
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